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I. INTRODUCTION
In its never ending quest for the perfect judge, society continually
changes the judicial selection process. Because judges are not perfect,
but only human, the methods of judicial selection are constantly being
adjusted. Occasionally, more dramatic changes occur when earlier
methods are attacked as no longer acceptable and thrown onto the polit-
ical junk pile. When such situations arise, most parties struggle to deter-
mine which method of judicial selection, the proposed or the existing,
will best serve their personal interests. Incumbent judges try to identify
the method that will allow them to retain office with the least disruption
to their lives. Other participants, particularly the bar and the business
community, assess the various proposals in terms of the type of judges it
tends to produce. In some cases, members of the bar may be influenced
by the effect a particular method has on their personal chances of attain-
ing judicial office.' Consequently, no party comes to the process com-
pletely disinterested, notwithstanding protestations of lack of bias.
Ironically, the public, the group most affected by any proposed
change in judicial selection methods, is the least involved. Its role
remains largely that of a passive spectator, a muted Greek chorus,
although most citizens may not even be aware that anything significant
is transpiring. Courts and judges, though powerful social actors, are
obscure by design. This notion deliberately makes the politics of judi-
cial reform subterranean in nature.
The political and legal elites in Florida are currently considering
changing the method by which trial judges are selected. The proposed
* Professor of Political Science at the University of Central Florida and writer on topics
including judicial recruitment, sentencing guidelines, and public opinion of the courts.
1. All too often, we forget the goad of personal ambition in fostering change. New groups
move to the fore and demand their turn in the seats of power. Because no judicial selection
method is neutral, the choice of method always stimulates great interest in those involved.
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method is full merit selection, rather than the current system of nonparti-
san elections supplemented by gubernatorial merit appointments. Under
the full merit system, if implemented, Florida judges will all be selected
by the same judicial selection method for the first time since the early
1970s.2 This Paper will present some general thoughts on the judicial
selection process and will then focus on the difficulties of balancing the
conflicting values of judicial independence and judicial accountability.
II. SEARCHING FOR THE PERFECT METHOD
Throughout American history, state court judicial selection meth-
ods have been the product of changing social and political currents. His-
torically, six distinct judicial selection methods have been employed,
including legislative elections, gubernatorial appointment, partisan elec-
tion, nonpartisan election, selection by sitting judges and merit selec-
tions. No one selection method has eliminated its preceding system;
rather, the process has been mostly incremental in nature, with vestiges
lingering on from earlier experiments. For example, several states con-
tinue to employ legislative election.
Each method, in its heyday, was perceived by its advocates as an
improvement on its precursor. Social concerns have shifted over time,
rendering earlier arrangements obsolete, or at least less compatible with
current needs. Jacksonian democracy, for example, with its emphasis on
popular participation in the selection of public officials and a pervasive
feeling that such powerful positions should be open to every qualified
person, led to partisan election as the dominant selection method by the
mid-nineteenth century.
More recently, the preferred basis for judicial selection has been
professional qualifications. As a result, nonpartisan election and several
forms of merit selection have become the favored vehicles for selecting
judges.' Each method emphasizes social values; thus, because values
change overtime, the preference for a particular selection method is
bound to be short-lived. Later participants in the system often find their
predecessors' motives incomprehensible or unacceptable.
Over the past thirty years, Florida has experimented with four of
the methods identified above. Three of these methods are still partially
in place: gubernatorial appointments, nonpartisan election process at the
2. Roger Handberg, The Florida Courts: Change and Adaptation, in GOVERNMENT AND
PoLrrics IN FLORIDA 192, 201 (Robert J. Huckshom ed., 1991).
3. -hRY J. ABRAAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22 (6th ed., 1993).
4. For a survey of merit selection plans, see Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current
Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. Rnv. 1 (1994), accompanying this Article.
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trial court level, and full merit selection at the appellate level.' The
state's political and legal elites have hammered out these fragile political
arrangements against a background of massive population growth and
the political and social dislocation associated with such growth. Contin-
ued dissatisfaction with the competitive election process (whether parti-
san or nonpartisan) has led to intensified lobbying efforts aimed at
converting the entire state judiciary to full merit selection.
III. AsSESSING THE DIVERGENCE
In America, the public debate regarding judicial selection methods
is driven by two divergent values: judicial independence and judicial
accountability. While not diametric opposites, each of these values
emphasizes different facets of the judicial role.' Judicial independence
emphasizes the effective isolation and separation of the judge from soci-
ety, while judicial accountability focuses on the intimate connection
between the governors and the democratically governed. The isolation
required by judicial independence is perceived as necessary to preserve
the unbiased nature of judicial decisions. Such decisions should be
based on the legal merits of the controversy, not personal favor, whim,
or other prejudicial influences. Judicial accountability emphasizes the
judge's responsibility to society as a whole and its citizens. As with all
good stewards, judges are occasionally called upon to render an account-
ing of their stewardship.
Judicial reformers in the United States must resolve the resulting
tension in a fashion that sustains both values. Reform-minded legal pro-
fessionals have focused their efforts on maintaining judicial indepen-
dence. This value preference reflects the view that properly inculcated
professional values and legal expertise (e.g. embodied in concepts such
as the rule of law) are sufficient to restrain any potential abuse and make
judicial accountability unnecessary. When abuse of judicial power
5. Under Florida's limited merit selection process, the governor appoints interim trial court
judges after merit review by the circuit commission. At the next election, however, opponents can
challenge and run against the sitting judge. Therefore, this method lacks the retention election
component, whereby a judge runs against his or her own record, but not an actual opponent. In
point of fact, most incumbents run unopposed, unless there is either a controversy or perceived
weakness. Burton Atkins writes that appointment followed by unopposed re-election has been the
dominant pattern for many years, although it is now declining. Burton Atkins, Judicial Elections,
What The Evidence Shows, 50 FLA. B. J. 152, 154 (1976).
6. These two values appear to be the most central within the American political context,
although other values do exist. For example, the value of judicial competence has been much
touted, although it is difficult to define the characteristics of a good judge. Code words used to
describe "good" judges, such as "adherence to precedent" or "judicial deference" have had
different values at different points in history.
7. In effect, the judges carry their values, their internal compasses, with them. These values
are the product of proper legal education and professional experience. Judges are experts, and
1994]
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does occur, the legal system provides remedial mechanisms, albeit often
very slowly and too late. This professional vision, which permeates
much of the legal reform literature, is a reversal of the earlier Jacksonian
view that the people themselves, through their free and unincumbered
choice, could best evaluate who should govern them. Those in office
were there on sufferance and a short leash. Both of these traditions con-
tinue, although the professional view on judicial independence is becom-
ing increasingly dominant. Our discussion proceeds against this shifting
ideological background.
IV. INFORMAL DEFINITIONS
In order to further structure the discussion, we must offer an infor-
mal working definition of each concept. Our purpose is to isolate cer-
tain essential elements, rather than provide a logically complete and all-
inclusive definition. Judicial independence refers to the notion that
judges must have physical and emotional space to render impartial deci-
sions, without fear of retribution (either formal or informal) for unpopu-
lar, yet sound, decisions.
It goes without saying that judicial decisions do not satisfy every-
one. The very nature of judicial decisions means simply that someone
wins and someone loses. Losing parties often attribute their loss to bias
among officials, rather than objective outcomes.8 While bias certainly
exists in the occasional case, more frequently the losing party simply has
a weaker case.
To reduce the appearance of prejudice, elaborate normative struc-
tures have evolved that isolate judges from ex parte contacts regarding
pending or projected cases and restrict their personal involvement in cer-
tain activities.9 Violating these norms can cost errant judges their posi-
tions, while outsiders can be sanctioned.
Protecting judges from all forms of retribution can be difficult.
Some sanctions are social, such as ostracism by the local community, as
occurred in the South during the 1950s.1 Other sanctions are physical;
some judges have been murdered by disgruntled litigants and defend-
experts know best what society requires. In other contexts, this hubris has generated strong
reactions because, as Justice Stone wrote in a dissenting opinion several years ago: "[T]he only
check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936).
8. Sometimes, for tactical reasons, an attorney may initially "lose" in order to appeal to a
wider and more friendly forum. Civil rights attorneys pursued this strategy in the South in the
early 1960s, when Mississippi federal district courts were hostile to their claims, but the Fifth
Circuit was more amenable.
9. See Jack B. Weinstein, Learning, Speaking, and Acting: What Are the Limits For
Judges?, 77 JUDICATURE 322 (1994).
10. JACK W. PELTASON, FIFTY EIGHT LONELY MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND
[Vol. 49:127
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ants. Official sanctions can be direct, such as efforts to remove judges
from the bench through impeachment, failure to reappoint, or defeat at
the next election. They can also be indirect, such as denial of promotion
to a higher court, reductions in court budgets, or denial of salary
increases. Generally, most acts of retribution are concealed because
public norms and laws prohibit overt actions. In actuality, sanctions are
more frequently threatened than imposed.
Judicial accountability is informally defined as the definitive
review of judges in set intervals by those whom they serve. Definitive
review refers to the process by which a judge loses office upon a nega-
tive evaluation by the public.
Public review, in principle if not reality, acts as a check on any
arbitrary and capricious exercise of judicial power. Each judge removed
from office provides a moral example, to those remaining, of the effec-
tive limits of judicial power. While most judges continue in office, the
worst, most abusive, and most incompetent are removed. The process is
admittedly imperfect, but within a democratic setting, meets the crude
test of judicial accountability.
For accountability to be effective, judges need not actually be
defeated. Rather through the evaluation process itself they are reminded
of their relationship to the people they serve. In effect, evaluation pro-
vides a dose of humility to those who occupy positions of power and
receive deference from those around them.
Balancing judicial independence and judicial accountability has
long haunted the judicial selection and retention process at the state
level. By contrast, federal judges, particularly Article III appointees, are
distanced from real accountability by conscious political design. This
trend may be changing, however, if the increased use of the impeach-
ment process over the past decade persists, although it is more likely that
these recent cases reflect only unusually obstinate judges who had
refused to resign.'I
It can be argued that people consider state judges to be far too
important to be insulated the way federal judges are. State courts still
have a much greater impact on the lives of individuals than do federal
courts. The bulk of cases disposed by state courts, especially criminal,
personal injury, and family law matters focus directly on individuals.
The state court's focus on the individual has become even stronger in
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 9-10 (1961). Professor Peltason reported on the social isolation of
federal judges who strove to enforce the Supreme Court's Brown decisions.
11. MARY VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT: NOitE CALLED FOR JUSTICE (1993).
Professor Volcansek reviews the most recent impeachment cases, including that of Alcee Hastings
of Florida, who was removed inspite of his acquittal of criminal charges.
1994]
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recent years, as the federal courts have attempted to withdraw ever fur-
ther from cases resolvable by state courts. While Congress has made
some efforts to increase federal involvement in areas such as domestic
violence, the historical pattern has been for state courts to deal with the
more personalized problems of society. Due to this individualist orien-
tation, judicial accountability remains an important component in
debates about state judicial selection and retention processes.
This view of state courts, however, presumes a personal link
between the judge and the electorate.' 2 This is a link, not in the intimate
sense, but in the electorate's general awareness of the judge's actions. It
is this personalized linkage which has proven to be the weak point in the
accountability process, because the public remains largely unaware of
judicial activity. The dilemma in Florida is that we are a rapidly grow-
ing state of strangers; government officials at all levels are unknown to
new arrivals. Even the rural counties have grown significantly, chang-
ing the dynamics of the electoral relationship assumed to operate there.
For courts in particular, the linkage with the public is especially
frayed, due to the general obscurity of judicial institutions-an obscurity
fostered by judicial norms minimizing public exposure and bar norms
protecting that obscurity. The bar, the group best informed about the
courts, is unwilling and, by some lights, unable to provide objective
information about judicial performance. This means that we, the public,
are largely unaware of who our local judges are and how well they are
performing their duties.
The result of this lack of information is that public judicial evalua-
tions, either through regular competitive elections or retention elections,
have many of the characteristics of a lightning strike on a Florida golf
course: When it hits, it comes out of the blue, without warning. Most
judges do survive their encounter, however, since relatively few judicial
elections are contested. For example, a survey of retention elections
from 1980 to 1990 found that out of 2,641 judges, only thirty-four (or
1.3%) were not retained. In fact, only sixteen of these thirty-four judges
failed to receive a majority vote. In Illinois, eighteen judges were not
retained because they failed to achieve the sixty percent approval rate,
although they did receive a majority of votes.'"
The reality is that judicial accountability through the election pro-
cess is minimal. Usually there are no issues, no opponents, and no pub-
12. The difficulties of establishing accountability can be seen in PHILIP L. DuBols, FRoM
BALLOT To BENCH, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1980). Most
judges are re-elected with minimal opposition.
13. Robert C. Luskin et al., How Minority Judges Fare In Retention Elections, 77
JUDICATURE 316, 319-20 (1994).
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licity. When opposition based on ideology or issues actually does arise
in a retention election, the debate is indirect and often confusing to the
public. For example, in 1990, Justice Leander Shaw 14 and, in 1992,
Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett confronted organized opposition to their
respective bids. The primary issue in both challenges was abortion,
although Chief Justice Barkett also confronted criminal justice issues
and encountered more strenuous opposition than did Justice Shaw. 5
While both justices were ultimately retained in office, their experience
show that the nature of retention elections has changed in Florida. Since
1990, the average negative vote has risen by about ten percent (from
25% to 34%). 16 There is greater dissatisfaction with judicial institutions,
but its expression remains inchoate due to a lack of effective leadership
and intensity on the part of the public. Florida's retention elections may
be moving closer to situations such as the one faced by California Chief
Justice Rose Bird.'7
There continues to be a concern that a judge's excessive fear that he
will be publicly singled out for performing a controversial action close
to election time may compromise judicial independence. Judicial deci-
sions are frequently controlled by factors other than the judge's prefer-
ences (if one holds to the concepts of precedent and rule of law).
Consequently, these decisions can be controversial within local commu-
nities. Chief Justice Barkett argued this view, to mixed response, during
her retention campaign.
Given the inertness of the general public regarding the courts, a
small but vocal single issue group can have a disproportionate impact on
an election, because it may be the only emotional voice raised in opposi-
tion or support. Most judges campaign in obscurity, with little name or
other, public recognition. Some judges fear that a single act or decision
can crystalize opposition, an opposition beyond reason or change, before
the vote. Therefore, in theory, judges may avoid hard choices or unduly
delay proceedings when an election looms close at hand.
On the one hand, one could argue that the accountability process is
working, albeit crudely. On the other, uninformed votes are not helpful
and, furthermore, undermine the case for accountability. More realisti-
14. Donna O'Neal, Anti-Abortion Activists Put Pressure On Shaw, OR.ANEo SENTINEL
TRIBUNE, Oct. 4, 1990, at B4.
15. Roger Handberg, "Gender, Crime and Abortion: Judicial Retention and Florida Supreme
Court Justice Rosemary Barkett" (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Florida Political
Science Association, Winter Park, Florida, April 1993).
16. Michelle L. Young, Merit Retention Election, What The Evidence Shows (unpublished
paper, University of Central Florida, June 1994). The figures cited in this paper are based upon
official reports of the Division of Elections, Florida Department of State.
17. Cf. George F. Uelmen, Supreme Court Retention Elections In California, 28 SANTA
CLARA L. R. 333 (1988).
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cally, the process operates well, notwithstanding its imperfections, given
that the public receives little assistance from anyone who can provide
information and guidance. The most accessible source of information,
the media, focuses on the macabre and bizarre in a completely episodic
fashion. This provides the public with no hard information as to how
well the courts and individual judges are performing their functions.
Editorial endorsements are announced, but because they are sum-
mary statements, they are usually unrelated to any information useful to
the public in determining why one candidate was endorsed over another
in a competitive election or why a particular judge should be retained.
Because judicial campaigns, whether competitive or retention, are
largely without content, we must seek other mechanisms. There are no
magic solutions, only partial and imperfect ones.
The struggle to develop and implement such solutions is fundamen-
tal to a healthy democracy. If a democracy produces a judiciary exces-
sively remote from the public it serves, the result is a growing disrespect
for the law and, ultimately, the degradation of society's legitimacy. The
courts, and society in general, rely on uncoerced public compliance in
order to achieve just outcomes. When overused, official coercion gradu-
ally loses its effectiveness, especially in a democracy, a government
based on consent. Even authoritarian states, such as the former Soviet
Union, discovered that coercion was both inefficient and counterproduc-
tive. There must be a living link between the state courts and their clien-
tele, the people of the state.
. V. SOME IMPERFECT AND PARTIAL SUGGESTIONS
The following suggestions support this view that judicial accounta-
bility is as critical as judicial independence. Some are less feasible than
others, because they require genuine change by institutions that are
either reluctant or unable to change. None of these suggestions com-
promises judicial independence. In fact, each strengthens it, by
reaffirming that judicial power is not, and will not be, exercised capri-
ciously. These suggestions accept the political reality that merit selec-
tion is likely to continue, regardless of its outcomes.
First: The public component on judicial selection committees must
be strengthened. This first suggestion is both the simplest and most dif-
ficult to implement. Diversity is currently coming to the committees
through gubernatorial fiat-a policy likely to continue into the future
because it is inexpensive and does not restrict a governor's power of
patronage. I recommend the recruitment of public members, who are
both more interested and personally assertive in the process of evaluat-
ing prospective judicial candidates. Far too often, attorneys dominate
[Vol. 49:127
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the committees for reasons of expertise and interest. The selection of
judges is not a science, but rather an assessment of an individual's career
and his potential for growth. Business leaders and others engage in such
activities continuously and routinely; they do not suddenly become
incompetent when confronting attorneys. On the contrary, many busi-
ness leaders are shrewd judges of legal talent, because they employ legal
talent in their own daily affairs.
Instead, bar politics, with its special interest concerns, dominate the
selection process. Such politics are not public, but rather reflect narrow
economic and personal interests and are often contrary to the public
interest. Because bar politicians make claims of special expertise or
insight, these activities go effectively unchallenged in most instances.
Committees, especially the public members, should solicit evaluations
from outside the carefully constructed lists provided. A wider scope of
inquiry would provide a more varied and realistic view of the prospec-
tive candidates. The ABA Committee on the Federal Judiciary has taken
such a view of the evaluation process. Narrowly defining information
about candidates, and keeping it accessible, aids those with self-inter-
ested agendas.
Second: The evaluation of sitting judges needs to be strengthened
and reported to the public in an understandable format. This suggestion
is not new; other states have already begun implementing this process.
Some states, notably Colorado, have developed a multifaceted approach,
including actually observing judges in the courtroom. Through system-
atic observation, judges can be evaluated in terms of their interactions
with the public and other court room participants. This evaluation is
process oriented, rather than content oriented. Far too often, incompe-
tent or abusive judges remain in office until they push the state bar or
individual attorneys too far.18 Meanwhile, the public, lacking access to
an effective complaint mechanism and often the courage to act, suffers
from judicial tyranny.
The key here is providing comprehensible information to voters.
This approach replaces or supplements ongoing bar surveys, which
remain plagued by low rates of return and uninformed attorney voting
(that is, voting about judges with whom they have not professionally
dealt or whose opinions they have not read). The media generally
ignores such surveys, or else provides such cursory coverage as to effec-
tively ignore the survey results. Such surveys have little effect on public
18. Media reports in Florida recurringly demonstrate this pattern, where judges come into
conflict with the bar and only then does something happen. In actuality, many of the situations
fester for a while. But the key is that the bar moves wheni its prerogatives and feelings are hurt.
Until that point, the public is allowed to suffer.
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evaluations of judicial candidates.19
The obvious difficulty with implementing a more thorough evalua-
tion approach is in sustaining the necessary elaborate data collection
efforts after initial enthusiasm and volunteers disappear. Routinization
of new and controversial procedures is often difficult, partly because the
resistance and inertia among those affected (judges in this instance) is
strong and prolonged, and because the observation work required by this
evaluation process can be tedious and boring. Volunteer groups, such as
the League of Women Voters, may staff initial efforts, but over the long
term the efforts of such groups can degenerate into just another vested
interest.
The key is to make more useful information available to voters.
Whether voters use that information correctly is immaterial. What is
important is that information is made available; voters can exercise their
own choice about how to use it. While the elite often disparages voter
competence, in a democracy it is the voters who are the final judges of
what is done on their behalf. Elite actions and inactions have fostered
voter misinformation; their condescension, therefore, reflects only the
elite's past and ongoing failures to support an activist democracy. Dis-
paraging remarks about voters do not substitute for information that
enables voters to make more educated decisions.
The final suggestion similarly falls under the principle of increasing
information, but is more dependent upon the media for effective dissem-
ination. The Florida Supreme Court should publish each year, in an
accessible form to the public, an accounting of the court system's gen-
eral activities including a summary of disciplinary actions taken regard-
ing judges.
Judicial discipline in Florida is apparently successful, although it
operates largely as an invisible process, except in those rare instances
when unusual episodes surface in the public domain. These normally
involve a judge caught in some publicly embarrassing situation, and are
often resolved by the judge's resignation. The public perception of the
judiciary is, therefore, a mixture of rumors concerning judicial miscon-
duct and partial media reports of sensational cases. The result is a pub-
lic perception that judges are excessively protected from public scrutiny.
Publication of the annual reports for the state court system lags too
far behind events to be useful in informing the public of the system's
activities. The Chief Justice's public presentation to the State Legisla-
ture takes place in the confusion of the annual session, and is perceived
19. John M. Scheb, Is Anyone Listening? Assessing Bar Influence On Merit Retention
Election In Florida, 67 JUDICATURE 112 (1983). Scheb reported that Florida Bar surveys had little
discernable impact on voters' choices.
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as the self-interested pleadings of another bureaucrat seeking funding
from the public trough.
By including a summary of the disciplinary process with that public
report, the Court would reaffirm to the populace that its interests are
being protected, even though judges are routinely, and almost automati-
cally, returned to office. In light of the reality of automatic tenure, the
judicial discipline and removal process becomes even more central to
sustaining some notion of judicial accountability and instilling in the
public the perception that judges are accountable. This last suggestion
assumes that the electorate, when properly informed, will make intelli-
gent choices in their own best interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
Selecting judges is difficult, even under the best of circumstances.
The process is made more difficult in Florida, because the state is in the
process of redefining itself into a "California East" in terms of its diver-
sity and size. At the same time, the politics of the state are seeking a
new equilibrium as the traditional Democratic dominance fails and the
Republicans surge into power. These factors influence the changes in
the courts.
Merit selection of judges is not the answer to every question and
problem. In fact, merit selection may be wholly ineffective in handling
the problem of intense interest group involvement in retention elections.
The constraints on judges in responding to such attacks may leave the
judiciary in far worse peril than earlier systems did because, under the
new system, they have no automatic group rallying to their support.
Running as an individual professional can be lonely, especially if the bar
is split or neutral on the candidacy. Merit selection perceives judicial
selection as the sport of the professionals, a possibly self-interested and
outdated perspective. The public now considers courts to be too impor-
tant to be the exclusive prerogatives and provinces of the professionals.
That fact may distress the bar, but their own activities (through litiga-
tion) and the resulting decisions have made the courts too intrusive and
central for important social issues. When issues of life and death, such
as abortion, crime, and punishment motivate voters, the courts will be
buffeted by those public passions.
1994]
